Nor have we discussed the political fallout from using reconciliation, which in my view could be enormous:
The Bush tax cuts were popular; health care is not. Moreover, the filibuster actually polls well, so use of [reconciliation] would be unpopular. If you intersect an unpopular policy with an unpopular process, I don't know what you're going to get, but the downside risk would seem to be fairly profound -- as in, I'd take even money at that point that the Democrats would lose the House.
Also, tax cuts are a relatively straightforward application of the reconciliation process -- health care is not, and the resulting procedural debate would last weeks if not months, giving the public plenty of time to stew over it.None of this is to say that the reconciliation strategies are impossible. They might work. But the hurdles are much more significant than what Jon has implied, and reconciliation might also "work" but produce a worse, perhaps much worse, policy outcome. Even if one were willing to ignore the political fallout, it would be a fairly poor strategy. And when the consequences for the Democrats' electoral fortunes are taken into account -- as well as their compromised ability to pass policies like a jobs bill and financial reform next year -- it seems like a very poor risk.
My impressions of the reconciliation process, just like my impressions of the health care bill itself, are formed based on a combination of extensive reading in an area in with which I'm not so familiar (Senate procedure), coupled the expertise I've developed in politics and public opinion. It's a view that reflects the "consensus" that most others who have earnestly considered the issue have come to.
Maybe my view -- the broad consensus view -- is wrong. I'm sure the kill-billers will be ready to accuse me of being trapped within the confines of Beltway conventional wisdom (this would be an odd accusation, since 538 is a completely independent blog, is based in Brooklyn rather than Washington, and does not rely to any material extent on "insider" access). But I have not seen a robust and persuasive attempt to rebut the arguments that I and others have made about reconciliation. And I think, indeed, it forms something of a crutch: a convenient excuse not to have to commit to the question of whether the Senate's bill really is worse than the status quo, and a vehicle to direct one's anger at the White House, Joe Lieberman, Ben Nelson, and the rest of the usual suspects, instead of getting beyond it and working to facilitate the best policy.
There's a segment out there of the Left that's always hated Barack Obama. But then again, you can't please everybody.
2 comments:
Curious, do you find Nate's arguments convincing? The Hamsherites aren't even listening to details of HCR anymore, tacking all of their moral outrage on simple talking points like "public option" (no matter how strong) or "individual mandate" (no matter that it is the only way to extend universal coverage).
Booman was convinced from day one that there would be no meaningful PO from the Senate, and supports the bill despite that. I see a lot of reason for skepticism and watchfulness about the way this plays out. I also see this bill as imperfect and necessary of follow up legislation. What I don't see is any logic at all in starting this process over, it would kill any chance at reform for at least a decade.
Nate's base argument is decent. But you're right: this is a start, and a start only. How many times has civil rights legislation been changed? And it's still not perfect.
But the Civil Rights Act was a start.
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