Possible Procedure for the Constitutional Option
· On the first day of the 112th Congress, a member of the reform group would seek recognition from the Chair. Upon receiving recognition, s/he would say: "Mr. President, on behalf of the following Senators and myself, and in accordance with Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, I send to the desk a resolution and I ask that the Clerk read it." This would be a resolution containing the various reforms to the Senate rules.
· After the Clerk reads the Resolution, the Senator would ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration. If there is no objection, the Resolution is on the floor for debate.
· Most likely, there would be an objection. Senate rules require 1 legislative day's notice in writing to amend or modify a Senate rule. The Senator who offered the motion would then address the Chair and send to the desk a motion to amend a Senate rule and ask that the notice be read.
· At some point, the Senate would adjourn, rather than recess, so the reformer's Resolution would comply with the one-day notice rule. (The Senate majority leader determines whether the Senate recesses or adjourns at the end of a day.)
· Reform Senators would need to object to any attempt to transact substantive business or seek a unanimous consent request to that effect. The objective is to ensure that the reformers do not waive any rights to amend Senate rules on opening day by majority vote. Thus, "opening day" could be extended for several days or weeks.
· On the day the Senate returns after an adjournment, the Chair would lay the Resolution before the Senate during the morning hour. At the conclusion of the morning hour, the Resolution would be placed on the calendar. At that time the sponsor of the Resolution would move that the Senate proceed to its consideration. Debate on the motion that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the Resolution would follow.
· Opponents could (a) move to table the reformer's Resolution reaffirming the continuity of Senate rules; (b) move to refer the Resolution to the Committee on Rules and Administration; (c) defeat the motion to call up the Resolution; (d) reject the Resolution outright; or (e) raise a constitutional point of order against the Resolution. Assuming there is a majority in favor of reform, all of these tactics would fail.
· The constitutional challenge would likely come if a filibuster is launched against either the motion to call up the Resolution or on the Resolution itself. After a reasonable period of debate, a member of the reform group would move to cut off debate by a simple majority vote. A point of order would likely be made that the move to cut off debate is contrary to the continuous nature of Senate rules. The Chair would submit the point of order to the Senate because it raises a constitutional question. The point of order is debatable.
· As occurred three times in 1975, a majority could vote to table the point of order, thus upholding the right of a simple majority to end debate on a rules change.
· Throughout these procedural steps, there would be negotiations on the rules reforms that might be able to pass with a supermajority. This is how the filibuster rule was amended in 1959 and 1975 - the looming threat of a majority vote on cloture forced a compromise.
You get all that? And all that mess will most likely result in Republicans deciding to come to the table on filibuster reform, and the negotiations would start all over again.
Awesome. And people wonder why Congress is about as popular as herpes.
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